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362 theories, IOs are built to serve powerful states' interests (neorealism) or meet certain functional needs among like-minded states (neoliberal institutionalism). Under this rationalist position, while an IO may help preserve the extant power equilibrium (neorealism) or reduce transaction costs (neoliberal institutionalism), it seldom has a life of its own. 15 Unsurprisingly, conventional IR theories tend to limit their analytical focus to IOs' creation and the interstate dynamics that lead up to their creation. Thus, IOs' institutional development is an underexplored issue in a rationalist world. 16 To rationalists, an IO is a "great yawn." 17 Nonetheless, rationalism could not capture a complete picture of an IO, particularly an IO's operation. If seen as a mere tool for states, one might not be able to explain how an IO evolves on its own terms as an autonomous entity as it incessantly interacts with its surroundings. 18 An IO also emerges on its own terms, 19 rather than being simply created by states. Considering an IO's various autonomous roles, such as an arbiter and a manager of enforcement, 20 this theoretical deficit is problematic: it fails to render an adequate explanation on the IO's institutional life cycle.
This Article proposes a novel perspective to plug the theoretical gap 21 with the identity theory in developmental psychology, the Article probes an IO's internal development in which one can witness a dynamic legal process of identity formation. This interdisciplinary approach proffers a theoretical framework that demonstrates how an IO, as a socio-legal actor, develops, transforms, and becomes more sophisticated.
The Article argues that based on its autonomy 22 as an independent organization-and not merely as an instrument of states-an IO forms its organizational identity as it experiences an identity crisis similar to the way in which a person does. Initially, states create IOs to serve a specific function. Thus, IOs may have default purposes that their creators (states) have programmed into them. However, an IO's retention of this programmed purpose results from a mere identification with its creators, not from the genuine identity that the IO has formed at subsequent stages during the course of its legal-institutional evolution. An IO acquires its organizational identity only after it achieves a necessary level of institutional maturity through legal interactions and communications with its environment.
This process is certainly no less daunting to an IO than to a person because an IO also suffers strains and pressures from its role expectation in the international society. Just as an adolescent experiences an identity crisis in interactions with peers and with society in general, an IO is exposed to a similar ordeal in adjusting its normative goals to various external pressures. In particular, IOs often undergo a testing situation where their old structures grow increasingly incapable of coping with new demands from their altered environment. Confronted with this crisis, IOs may attempt to reconfigure their legal-institutional setting by fine-tuning their original teleology to a call from their new environment. Only then will the IOs' organizational existence remain relevant, therefore, creating a socio-legal reality 23 by forming a genuine identity. Against this backdrop, the Article attempts to theorize IOs' legalinstitutional development as independent organizations from the standpoint of identity formation, and tests this proposed theory by applying it to the WTO. Part II of this Article discusses a theoretical foundation for the 21 See discussion infra Part II.B. 22 An IO's autonomy may be weak or strong. A "weak autonomy" is a de jure autonomy existing only in the book rendered by an IO's legal personality. Yet a "strong autonomy" is a de facto autonomy substantiated by such criteria as the size of membership, the size of bureaucracy, the frequency and density of operation (activities), and the organizational output (norms and other behavioral guidelines). In those institutions having a strong autonomy the process of identity-formation is an observable phenomenon enabled by a sufficient period of organizational duration and a rich amount of institutional experiences. 23 Anthropomorphism lays a foundation for an interdisciplinary methodology informed by social science. After sketching Erik Erikson's celebrated identity theory, 25 Part III applies this theory to IOs, in addition to outlining various parameters of identity formation-history, environment, goals, and technology.
Part IV tests the theory of an IO's identity formation by applying it to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its successor, the WTO. Part IV demonstrates how the WTO experienced an identity crisis as the original pro-trade bias embedded in its old self (GATT) embraced new challenges involving nontrade values, such as protection of the environment and human health. Part IV also proposes an optimal path for the WTO's development, which embodies an institutional balance between traditional trade values and these nontrade values.
Finally, a disclaimer is in order. This Article does not intend to debunk traditional IR theories generally. Granted, their parsimony may explain state behaviors with regards to an IO more clearly than what is proposed in the Article. In particular, to the extent that states constitute a critical environment to an IO, powerful members' interests may still constrain the scope of an IO's autonomy. 26 Rather, this Article aims to fill in some of the blind spots of traditional IR theories, such as social theories on IOs. It purports to provide an overview on IOs' endogenous-normative dynamics and serve as a preliminary yet useful avenue for further discussions in this nascent field.
II. ARE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AUTONOMOUS?
Are IOs Autonomous? This part attempts to answer this question by first analyzing the functional view that denies IOs' autonomy. It then turns to blind spots that the functional view leaves behind, such as the 24 See, e.g., Barnett & Coleman, supra note 18, at 594 (regarding IOs as actors which adopt various strategies to cope with environmental pressures and arguing that these strategies lead to "change in their tasks, design, and mandate") (emphasis added). 25 
A. Functionalism and Its Discontents
Conventional IR theories tend to regard an IO as a machinery of interstate cooperation. These theories posit that sovereign states create and operate IOs to achieve a better world system by enmeshing them in mutually beneficial transactions. 27 This rationalistic approach highlights an IO's functional merits, which include reducing uncertainty and transaction costs in the absence of any specific institutional context. 28 This is an economistic approach that assumes that states prioritize their interests to maximize efficiency and therefore use IOs as rational instruments to achieve such goals.
29
This inorganic view of IOs may be a logical conclusion with regards to traditional IR theories, including neorealism, which are theories about states. 30 These theories aim to analyze and understand why and how states interact and cooperate among themselves, which is evident in their appellation, international relations. This state centered view rejects an IO's ontological autonomy 31 as a self-governing, purposive actor. Under this framework, even if an IO may facilitate or constrain certain state behaviors by creating and controlling the flow of information between states, that causality still does not give the IO autonomy.
32
For example, to neorealists, any meaningful contributions by IOs are made through and by states. In sum, IOs exert no independent impact on state behavior.
33
Absent autonomy, the actual operation or evolution of an IO in its post-creation stages remains underexplored. 34 Neorealists may infer certain hypotheses about changes in an IO since its creation. 40 Ness & Brechin, supra note 15, at 247-48 ("Few have noted that organizations differ over time, or that they perform differently from one another, or that they achieve their ends with varying effectiveness or efficiency."). 41 In the 1970s, an intellectual thirst for a systematic explanation of "international governance" amid an "anomaly" of developments, such as the relative decline of U.S. hegemony and the rise of OEPC, gravitated many scholars toward the "international regime" theory. 
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According to them, even the strongest cooperation facilitated by a regime could not make it an independent organization. 47 Thus, it is no wonder that, to regime theorists, a regime is quite fragile; it exists against the backdrop of anarchy, which constrains interstate cooperation and is hard to achieve even when states share common interests. 48 As a corollary, regime theory fails to address two important organizational issues. First, it cannot fully explain an organic interaction between IOs and their environment. Second, regime theory cannot evaluate whether each regime is as legitimate or effective as an independent organization since all of the regime's performance is attributable logically to states.
Neoliberal institutionalists appear to offer a more advanced explanation of IOs' autonomy than earlier institutionalists, such as regime theorists. Neoliberal institutionalists acknowledge that IOs may be an independent variable since they can condition and regulate states' behavior. 49 Nonetheless, even under neoliberalism, an IO's role in international politics does not go deep enough to constitute states' interests and identities. 50 Thus, even neoliberal institutionalists might be tempted to circumvent global norms once they conclude that those norms are inconsistent with their liberal agenda.
To that extent, neoliberal institutionalists also regard regimes, and by extension IOs, as tools for states to advance domestic values and preferences.
Furthermore, neoliberal institutionalism still encounters certain difficulties in developing a genuine macro theory on IOs that fully explains and predicts an IO's evolution on its own terms, not due to member states' interests or preferences. 53 To neoliberal institutionalists, an IO's disciplinary (supranational) authority may be delegated from the member states toward them in pursuing certain goals. Yet this is a variation of the instrumental view, not a genuine organizational autonomy that this Article addresses. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 14, at 18-19 (describing this variation of instrumentalism as "laundering"). 47 In this context, the regime literatures did not surpass those of general international relations even in its heyday (1980s 
B. Embracing the Organizational Autonomy
The Westphalian tradition of public international law, built on the notion of state sovereignty, might not fully embrace the constructivist logic of an IO's ontological independence because it would undermine states' monopoly of power. Under the traditional view, the only restriction on a state's sovereign power was self-restriction. 55 In other words, treaties created by sovereign states' consent could only regulate the concerned states because the sovereign states had given their word, not because those treaties constituted an autonomous organization of elevated hierarchy. However, the traditional notion of sovereignty was vulnerable to the Hobbesian struggle, eventually leading to two world wars. Thus, it was no coincidence that the postwar reconstruction of international order was conducted through independent IOs that would govern states' behaviors. Interestingly, postwar IOs play unique regulatory roles in certain sector specific areas, such as collective security-the United Nations (UN)-and international financial regulation-the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
The postwar prominence of IOs engendered new international law that put the IOs' legal personality and organizational autonomy under the spotlight. 56 First, Charters of IOs declared their legal personalities. Article 104 of the UN provides that "the Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfilment [sic] of its purposes." 57 Article 8:1 of the WTO Agreement also provides that the "WTO shall have legal personality, and shall be accorded by each of its Members such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions." 58 Likewise, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), in its Reparation case, ruled that an IO is a "subject of international law and capable of 54 
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. 55 The classical concept of sovereignty of nation states, which was deeply territorial, emerged in Europe at the end of the Thirty Years' War in 1648 (the Peace of Westphalia). It meant an absolute control of a national state within its own border. According to this historical concept, a sovereign state answers no higher authority, including an IO. See Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, Furthermore, modern international law also recognizes the IOs' professional identity, accentuating their distinctive functional mandate and competence.
For example, the ICJ rejected the World Health Organization's (WHO) request to deliver an advisory opinion addressing whether states' use of nuclear weapons violates international law because this issue did not fall within the rubric of the WHO's activities. 62 This decision acknowledges that each IOs' distinguishable mission warrants organizational autonomy. Nonetheless, the existence of an IO's legal personality should not necessarily be equated with the IO's independent status separate from its creator-states. 63 Legal capacity may not be a sufficient condition for genuine autonomy. Varying institutional arrangements of IOs determine different patterns of governance and degrees of autonomy. Although the UN has its own legal personality, the UN is incapable of making any autonomous decisions over critical subjects, such as security, against the will of powerful members with veto powers. Furthermore, even if an IO enjoys a certain level of autonomy, sovereign states, which transfer part of their autonomy to the IO, may want to retract such a transfer. 64 Nonetheless, an IO's legal-institutional detachment from its members is still an important avenue for the IO's socio-political autonomy. In line with Weberian legal-rational authority in bureaucracy, legal personality tends to benefit an IO in claiming decisional authority on various issues and challenges falling within the rubric of its mandate. Along with this legal capacity follows other institutional software and hardware used to maintain its operational autonomy, such as operational rules, secretariat, 59 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 179 (Apr. 11, 1949 Importantly, an IO's legal personhood enables us to employ legal rhetoric with which we investigate and study an IO's operation. 66 Those legal narratives offer unique perspectives in understanding an IO's autonomy in terms of establishing consistent precedent and providing reasoned arguments conditioned on rules and principles, rather than particular states' interest. 67 As discussed above, however, this normative dynamic has blind spots under conventional IR theories.
Here, "constructivism" provides a social framework of organization building because it highlights how the shared norms emerge in an IO, become internalized, and eventually transform the behaviors of state actors. 68 While rationalism views that only exogenous (material) factors, such as power and interest, determine state behaviors, constructivism highlights that endogenous (ideational) factors, such as culture and values, can also guide such behaviors. 69 This endogenous social dynamic glues member states together with or without material incentives. Under constructivism, an IO's ontological autonomy results from its social norms composed of shared culture, knowledge, and discourse. First, social norms provide member states with a medium through which to communicate among, and thus understand, one another, much like a shared language. 70 Second, as these norm-governed interactions proliferate the original terms of individual identities gradually transform into a collective identity based on the "we" notion.
71
These legal discourses inform, inter alia, two paramount issues which concern IOs' autonomy: (1) what IOs produce, and (2) how they develop. First, some legal scholars have highlighted noticeable norm-generating ("jurisgenerative") 72 phenomena in certain areas within sector specific 65 See, e.g., UN Charter art. 19 ("A Member of the United Nations which is in arrears in the payment of its financial contributions to the Organization shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding two full years."). 66 This normative authority, as it is repeated and reinforced, equips these IOs with an aura of professional legitimacy, which in turn leads to a level of self-governance.
Second, an IO's legal personality is also inductive of a dynamic understanding of its authentic institutional self. Since the juridical personhood warrants a certain level of permanence in its institutional existence, in particular vis-à-vis agreements (treaties), one can engage in a serious exploration of an IO's unique pathway from creation through institutional evolution as a legally distinct entity (person). This facilitates a panoramic comprehension of the IO's operational autonomy. From a normative perspective, forming an IO's identity means establishing institutional criteria for behaviors or policies acceptable to the IO. Throughout its institutional lifetime, an IO embraces a different set of policies determined by its own understanding of its rationale (object and purpose).
Finally, an IO's autonomy should not translate into its disconnection from the environment. The natural or open system perspective views IOs as social groups desiring to survive by adapting to their particular environment.
79 Therefore, organizations are even capable of modifying their original goals to survive in the changing environment. Philip Selznick's celebrated institutional approach perfects this theory of organizational autonomy from the standpoint of this natural or open system.
80
According to Selznick, institutionalization enables social integration within an organization by converting randomly scattered technical activities into regularized and meaningful patterns. 81 Crucially, this institutionalization presupposes an open system that is distinguishable from a closed system, such as a cybernetic machine, which passively channels states' inputs. By actively interacting with the environment, an organization obtains both special capacity and character, 82 while also establishing its value.
C. Summary
To sum up the argument presented above, conventional IR theories, often dubbed as rationalism, treat IOs as mere instruments to aid states achieve various functional needs. An instrument does not have its own autonomy-a logical conclusion from intrinsic theoretical assumptions of 78 However, the social approach proposed in this Article focuses on the rich socio-legal dynamic within an IO. Legal discourses among states within an IO, if regularized and institutionalized, transform states' perception of interest and identity. The emergence of an IO's autonomy parallels a gradual shift from the original individual identities of states to an IO's collective identity. The next part explores the formation of this collective identity.
III. THEORIZING AN IDENTITY FORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
Having demonstrated that instrumentalism is misguided and should be replaced by autonomism, this part attempts to theorize the dynamic process of an IO's identity formation by drawing on human psychology. This theoretical borrowing or analogy may be controversial. Nonetheless, a common operational structure exists between an IO and a human being, particularly the way that each entity responds to and interacts with its environment for survival and development. This common structure eventually warrants the interdisciplinary approach. The identity theory in developmental psychology can be a useful theoretical avenue to illustrate an IO's dynamic transformation in its life cycle, which remains largely unexplained by the traditional IR theories.
A. The Identity Theory: Borrowing Insights from Psychology A person's identity impacts every aspect of her life, such as habit formation and interaction with others. 84 A preeminent developmental psychologist, Erik Erikson, suggested that a human being develops her identity by combining her understanding of the environment (group identity) and her own personal characters (personal identity). 85 Erikson's approach is often dubbed psychosocial; he posited that the individual and society are closely interrelated in their dynamic changes. 86 In particular, Erikson's theory of identity formation focuses on a dynamic pathway of human psychology in which an individual human being searches for, and eventually establishes, her genuine identity. This dynamic pathway is based on a human being's need to cope incessantly with the inevitable conflicts between prior and subsequent identifications with the environment as well as between the different social roles that these identifications may carry with them. Erikson posited an epigenic development model of identity formation in which every individual human being traverses through various stages in a life cycle, with each stage having its own set of circumstances of particular sensitivity, identity crisis, and potential. 88 The individual becomes a different person in each stage with different cognitive capacities and increasingly develops an ability to interact with a wider range of people.
Identity Formation: An Early Stage
Infants identify themselves entirely with their parents. 89 Subsequently, children also tend to attach themselves to other particular adults around them, such as their teachers and parents of their friends, and often imitate these adults' occupations.
90
Erikson characterized adolescence as a transition period from childhood into adulthood where an adolescent is engaged in the process of defining his own existence. 91 In adolescence, the former function of identification and attachment to values and roles, based on those of individuals one admires, is replaced by identity formation.
92
The adolescent declares a moratorium on adulthood while experimenting with different roles. 93 Erikson wrote that, during this stage, adolescents focus on defining themselves in terms of what they believe, what their goals are, and where they fit in society. 94 Adolescence, as the last stage of childhood, ends only when an individual replaces her childhood identifications with a new type of identification resulting from 87 See KROGER, supra note 86, at 25. 88 See CRISIS, supra note 85, at 91-141 (describing the different stages of the human life cycle). 89 Id. at 115. 90 Id. at 122. 91 Id. at 156-65. 92 Id. at 22-23 ("Identity formation employs a process of simultaneous reflection and observation, a process taking place on all levels of mental functioning, by which the individual judges himself in the light of what he perceived to be the way in which others judge him in comparison to themselves and to a typology significant to them; while he judges their way of judging him in the light of how he perceived himself in comparison to them and to types that have become relevant to him."). 93 See id. at 128 (explaining the developmental challenges of adolescents as they develop a sense of identity). 94 95 An individual will be formed only after the careful denial and assimilation of childhood identifications are attuned to a new configuration recognized by society.
Identity Formation: An Identity Crisis
The final identity, although it includes all significant identifications with key figures of the past, processes them in a way that builds a distinctive yet sensibly coherent whole. 96 During the final stage of identity formation, adolescents tend to suffer greatly from role confusion. 97 Past multiple identifications, and the roles that they prescribe, often conflict with one other. This disturbance is tantamount to a crisis or "a war within themselves."
98
Adolescents acquire a sense of direction only after weathering this Strum und Drang. 99 Then, they finally discover their suitability in society. 100 In this sense, the identity crisis is more of a rite of passage, rather than a calamity. 101 Erikson argued that the successful resolution of the identity crisis had a long lasting impact on the future stability and security of the individual and their ability to uphold commitments, deal with future hardships, and sustain relationships. 
The Failure of Identity Formation
Identity formation is not always successful. Adolescents often demonstrate a variety of pathological symptoms in the course of identity formation. They may fail to resolve tension in their engagement with others, which leads to a state of disorientation. 103 Erikson has labeled these pathologies as "identity confusion" or "identity diffusion." For example, they may make no commitments, or show no fidelity, to their genuine identity, as they do not experience an identity crisis. 104 They may also act baby-like ("diffusion of time perspective"), become unable to work or 95 Id. at 155. 96 concentrate ("diffusion of industry"), or choose to be antisocial and hostile ("negative identity").
105
Other problematic identity statuses include "foreclosure" and "moratorium." Foreclosure refers to a state in which adolescents have already made commitments to a certain identity without seriously exploring various identities available. Moratorium means that adolescents merely engage in such exploration without making any commitments. 106 In both situations, adolescents fail to form a genuine identity by the lack of either the search itself or accompanied commitments.
B. Is an International Organization a Person?

A Case for Anthropomorphism
Applying a psychological theory, such as Erikson's identity theory, to an IO's operation necessitates a certain degree of anthropomorphism, which has its limits. Simply, one might not equate an IO's identity with that of a person. After all, an IO's identity may not be as coherent as that of a person since biology tends to accord her a more unitary identity than that of a corporate agency such as an IO.
107 It is also conceivable that a tension exists within an IO's identity, more precisely between an IO's collective identity and some states' individual identities. 108 Under certain circumstances, the short term interest of some powerful member states may undermine the unitary nature of the IO's holistic institutional structure represented by the collective identity.
Nonetheless, it is still true that both a person's behavior and an IO's operation can be observed as an outcome of each entity's own intentionality. An IO's action is no more reducible to its individual member states than a human action is reducible to chemical reactions in the brain. 109 In so far as both a person's behavior and an IO's action can be observed as real on its own terms, one can explain and predict such behavior and action. 110 To this extent, one could draw on psychology, such as Erikson's identity theory, to better understand the identity dynamics of an IO, bearing in mind the aforementioned caveat on anthropomorphism.
Again, sociologist narratives tend to make unique contributions in accommodating anthropomorphism to understand IOs' operational autonomy in their organizational lifetimes (i.e., how they evolve and what they generate), which eventually supply the foundation for the formation of 105 ERIKSON, supra note 94, at 167-73. 106 Id. 107 WENDT, supra note 16, at 221. 108 Id. at 337. 109 Id. at 221. 110 Id. at 223.
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34:359 (2014) 377 their identities. One way of advancing an IO's identity formation is to project this dynamic process into a well-established paradigm of human developmental psychology. Carefully reflecting on an IO's operational nature tends to warrant this anthropomorphism. As a juridical person, an IO is an autonomous, organic entity that owes its existence to its own incessant adaptations to its ever-changing environment, much like a human being. Unlike a closed system, such as a cybernetic system, in which inputs from the environment can never change internal elements of an organization, both humans and organizations are open systems that can self-sustain by adjusting to the environment. 111 The environment provides an organization with necessary material resources, such as hardware (physical infrastructure), software (technology), and "humanware" (staff), as well as symbolic resources, such as reputation.
112
This shift in the analytical focus from a closed to open system highlights the critical significance that the environment exerts on organizational identity, 113 as it does on the human identity. Like a human being, an organization pursues a homeostatic equilibrium vis-à-vis the external environment as it builds and adapts its individuality in its institutional development. 
A Corporate Identity as a Supporting Analogy
In fact, some organization theorists have already devoted their attention to certain self-conceptions collectively held by members of an organization such as a corporation. This "corporate identity" can be defined as a consistent and durable set of values that each organization uniquely holds. 115 The corporate identity offers yet more support for using an identity theory analogy in studying the dynamic transformation of IOs. 116 Indeed, many scholars of business administration have focused on a corporate identity, drawing on lessons from psychology. Their common observation is that a corporation, like a human being, develops its identity through an unremitting process of interaction with its environment for its own survival. 117 At the same time, a corporation's identity formation process is also normative in that human beings and corporations pursue 111 Shortly after its creation, a corporation tends to be highly utilitarian and is identified with its leader's ideology. 119 A corporation, like a human being, desires to preserve its self-esteem and avoids any psychological pain and discomfort by mobilizing various defense mechanisms. 120 However, to survive the challenging environment through capacity building, a "learning" corporation embraces evolving identities through critical selfreflection and discourse about future identities. 121 Since an identity is of an enduring and conservative nature, its development process may be unstable, as in the case of an adolescent.
122
A corporation adjusts its original identity to the need of its environment as it internally reflects on its external perception (images) received from the environment, including the media, regulators, competitors, and customers. 123 As a corporation responds to external challenges, its members form an internal normative belief through socialization which defies the original identity identified with its founder's ideology.
C. Toward a Theory of an International Organization's Identity
Against the background discussed above, the first point of analogy from Erikson's identity theory to an IO's identity theory is an actor's transformative interaction with its environment. Similar to adolescents' identity formation process, both corporations and IOs also experience certain socialization pressures from their environment. As a result, these organizations are often forced to diversify their institutional selves into multiple roles that should eventually be integrated into an internally coherent identity.
125 Naturally, identity formation is not a smooth process for either a human being or an organization. It may be accompanied by confusion, fatigue, and stress. In short, it is a crisis. 118 
Identity Formation: An Early Stage
Under Erikson's identity theory, children identify themselves with their parents, and to be more precise, with their parents' culture and value system. This domestic dimension of historical legacy is thrust upon children as the first factor that provides a foundation for their identity formation. In case of a corporation, its founders often leave enduring impacts, both positive and negative, on its subsequent development of corporate identity. 126 Likewise, the founding history of an IO renders an initial influence on their identities. As an internalized past, this history tends to determine, or at least correlate with, present and future behaviors of IOs by frontloading founding states' rationale and character. Like DNA in the human body, the organizational history bestows upon IOs a certain institutional heredity, thereby marking a unique path dependence for each organization. The organizational history is often used as an interpretive criterion for determining whether organizations' or their participants' behavior is permitted or prohibited under their charters or constitutions.
Interestingly, the tenacious impact of history on each IO's identity formation stems from the fact that it cannot be simply discarded or disposed of even if it subsequently becomes obsolete or ineffective. Purging an old organization and restarting afresh would be costly. In this sense, all institutional changes tend to be path dependent. More often than not, sunk costs make old patterns survive a long time before new ones prove the former obsolete. 128 Old habits die hard and relics of the former structure or culture remain even though they might be cocooned beneath a new institutional coating.
Identity Formation: An Identity Crisis
As is the case in human identity formation, the environment is a critical parameter to the formation of an organizational identity. An organizational identity is shaped by an IO's conscious interactions with the environment and guided by an organization's role expectation, as well as the expectations that the organization perceives from its environment (society). behave and perform. 129 This unremitting process of challenge and response between an IO and the environment can be viewed as an IO's identity crisis. An IO processes complex information provided by the environment and forms its identity in accordance with the messages contained in those challenges. 130 In this sense, an IO's identity crisis emerges amid an assiduous dialogue with the environment.
131
As a legal person, an IO's identity crisis can be translated into a normative process. As discussed above, identity forming organizational changes, which are inevitable for an IO's institutional survival, are basically teleological 132 and constitutive since these changes define and redefine its organizational goals, and thus regulate the behavior of members and the organization itself. 133 This teleological and constitutive process is best captured by norms and legal discourse within an IO. Legal principles and legal arguments mediate intersubjective discourse and interaction among members, as well as between members and the IO itself.
134
Organizational goals are a leitmotif of an IO's norm driven identity crisis. They are the rationale of its existence. Initially, they are given by an IO's creators (states) and often engraved in its charter. Organizational goals provide essential interpretive guidance when IOs' determine whether a certain action is acceptable. 135 In this regard, as Selznick noted, an organizational goal can be an "ideological weapon" with which to defy opposition and mobilize support from the environment.
136
Yet as an IO achieves its identity through dynamic (historical) development, it also alters, or at least fine tunes, the original objective and purpose, as adolescents depart from the earlier deep identifications with their parents. In other words, organizational goals must be adjustable for 129 . 132 See Ness & Brechin, supra note 15, at 246. 133 See Keohane, supra note 13, at 382 (observing that "institutions do not merely reflect the preferences and power of the units constituting them; the institutions themselves shape those preferences and that power" and that "institutions are therefore constitutive of actors as well as vice versa") (emphasis added). 134 Empirical confirmations for this goal dynamism are seen in the phenomena of "mission creep" of major international organizations, such as the IMF and the World Bank. 138 For example, an internal teleological interpretation has modified the identity of World Bank from a narrow development organization as stipulated in Article 1 of its charter (Articles of Agreement), which would more or less tackle members' economic well-being calculated by per capita income, to a more broadly mandated organization that now addresses comprehensive sociocultural issues, such as women's rights, the environment, education, and health. 139 If organizational goals are a subjective dimension of recurring theme in an IO's identity crisis, its technology is an objective one. An IO's technology refers to its functional capability to perform in order to achieve its goals.
140
It delineates its domain, and eventually its identity, by determining what kinds of products or services it may provide for whom.
141
For example, the IMF's identity as a financial organization is inextricably linked to the fact that it is capable of monitoring and regulating international financial flows.
The identity of the World Health Organization (WHO) as a health organization is also connected inseparably to the fact that it can monitor and regulate health related matters, such as the distribution of flu vaccines. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)'s identity as a nuclear energy organization hinges on the fact that it can monitor and regulate nuclear energy issues, such as peaceful use of atomic energy.
Yet as an open system, an organization can also import technology from its environment. 142 Experiencing the identity crisis as it interacts with the environment, an organization can change the core technology by modifying its software (skills and other social knowledge), "humanware" (personnel and bureaucrats), and hardware (infrastructure and suborganizations). 143 Organizational learning is a purposeful behavior to increase IOs' problem solving (functional) capacities in order to achieve certain institutional goals and therefore plays a critical role in shaping organizational identities.
The Failure of Identity Formation
If an IO cannot survive its identity crisis, it fails to achieve its true identity. First, in the face of challenges by the changing environment, it may still remain attached to an old identification prescribed by its creators, i.e., states. This unresponsiveness to the environment, which may be equivalent to "foreclosure" in human psychology, eventually leads to "inefficient, self-defeating behavior." 145 Second, if an IO is confused by multiple identifications and fails to commit itself to one coherent identity, its identity is diffused ("identity diffusion"). Identity diffusion, like foreclosure, is a pathological symptom. It gravely reduces the output level of an IO. IOs may even cease to exist due to these pathologies.
D. Summary
This part first introduces Erik Erikson's identity theory that explains a human being's identity formation from a psycho-social perspective. To the extent that an organic entity, be it a corporation or an IO, develops as it continuously interacts with its environment, we could draw on Erikson's identity theory. This part draws on the recent literature on the corporate identity to demonstrate that scholars of business administration have already employed such a psychological approach in the studies of a corporation's life cycle.
Against this backdrop, the part theorizes an IO's identity formation. At an early stage, an IO, as does an infant, identifies its goal with its founders (states). Subsequently, however, an IO faces a moment of crisis as its original goal proves to be inadequate given new challenges from the environment. In response, norm oriented, teleological discourses within an IO adjust or modify its original goal in a way that addresses those 144 383 environmental challenges. Through this turbulent process (identity crisis) emerges an IO's collective identity, which is distinguishable from its members' individual identities. The next part applies this IO identity formation theory to the WTO to better understand its historical development as an organization.
IV. A CASE STUDY: THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
The previous part presents a theory of identity formation of an IO drawing from Erik Erikson's identity theory. This part applies it to the World Trade Organization (WTO). In its inception, the GATT, the WTO's predecessor, was created to fight against protectionism that had wreaked havoc on the world economy in the interwar period. It had started as a contract among a handful of states, with a strong leadership from the United States. Its framers had wanted the GATT to remain basically as a vehicle to coordinate tariff reduction negotiations and monitor protectionist policies. Thus, in early days the GATT could be identified with this rather functional arrangement under which state-oriented diplomacy prevailed over legal discourse. Trade liberalization characterized its identity.
However, the GATT's original pro-trade bias began to encounter enormous pressure from its environment as concerns for social hygiene increased all across the world in the Eighties. Outside criticisms of the GATT's original goal, and its identity, prompted the GATT to embrace a more mature teleology that can reconcile trade and nontrade (regulatory) value. In other words, the GATT underwent an identity crisis as it was forced to rethink its original pro-trade goal and transform itself into a new organization with a more balanced, integrationist identity, i.e., the WTO.
This part envisions an optimal path for the WTO's development, which embodies a normatively ideal manifestation of the WTO's identity. It might be analogous to a psychologically sound state of identity formation in a human being. To the WTO, it represents an institutional balance between traditional trade values and these nontrade values.
A. Identity Formation: An Early Stage
As one of the many chapters of a much more ambitious yet eventually aborted project of the International Trade Organization (ITO), GATT was originally more of a contractual document than an organization. In fact, GATT participants were named contracting parties, not members. They created the GATT against the background of mutually destructive protectionist trade policies in the interwar period, which had diminished world trade by seventy percent and thus contributed to the outbreak of Therefore, GATT's early identity as a tariff reduction arrangement can be said to have been identified with its creators, as children often identify their life goals with those of their parents. On the other hand, GATT's early identification with a strong pro-trade bias was a logical conclusion from the relative lack of its organizational autonomy. After all, the GATT was an instrument (contract) created by a handful of states (contracting parties).
Notably, GATT's functional nature, in its early days, is evidenced by the relics of private contract law embedded in old GATT jurisprudence. Since trade negotiation was basically a reciprocal exercise, contracting parties had to preserve the hard won delicate balance of concessions that each negotiation had produced. They had to maintain the values of those concessions by prohibiting parties from introducing any measures that might neutralize them later. Such cheating had to be condemned, and remedies instituted to restore the balance of concessions.
As a contractarian tool, GATT was identified with its creators' intention to preserve original terms of reciprocal bargains.
Given this history, GATT's earlier, remedial prototype was "nullification or impairment," which is close to the notion of injuries in contract law. Regardless of whether the measure in question is consistent with GATT norms, any injuries to a contracting party, namely the dilution of benefits of its concession should be remedied to preserve the balance of concessions made in the previous negotiation. 148 In practice, these injuries meant actual adverse commercial effects to the complainant exporting country, such as the loss of exports, which the defendant importing country's measure caused. GATT first resisted the rising tide of reregulation by striking down these regulations as simply trade restrictive. Although there existed the General Exception Clause, GATT Article XX, under which these regulations might be justified, not a single measure was ever actually saved under the clause in the GATT's history. 152 For example, in 1990, a GATT panel struck down the Thai ban on foreign cigarettes as an unnecessary trade restriction. 153 In that case, the Thai government tried to protect its people from a number of identifiable harms from chemicals and toxins contained in foreign cigarettes by banning those products. In fact, the WHO endorsed the ban. However, the panel ruled that the ban was an unjustifiable violation of the GATT rules because the Thai government could have found less trade-restrictive means than the ban, such as the "strict, , 1996) . Likewise, some economists have also noted that:
As globalization proceeds, however, it has become increasingly evident that one nation's economic policies can affect other countries. When nations were separated by high trade barriers and trade flows were limited, one country could ignore another nation's domestic economic policies. As barriers have come down, other countries' domestic policies have become much more important. 154 This ruling was severely criticized, not only because it ignored the WHO's opinion, but also because its prescription to the Thai government (i.e., labeling and disclosure regulations) was both unaffordable and ineffective for developing countries like Thailand at that time. 155 Therefore, while a pro-trade bias was faithful to GATT's identification as a trade agreement, this bias continuously invited criticism from its environment, in particular civil society and environmental organizations. These conflicts between GATT's adherence to the old protrade bias and pro-regulation pressure from the environment provided GATT with a perfect moment of identity crisis.
GATT's efforts to fix this bias and achieve a more mature identity gathered critical momentum in the launch of the WTO. The WTO's mission statement, contained in the preamble of its charter, spotlights "sustainable development." It has become obvious that due consideration and investment for nontrade values, such as the environment and human health, should be made within the WTO to achieve any development that is sustainable.
One can understand the creation of the Trade and Environment Committee, as well as special side agreements like the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), as the WTO's effort to grow out of the pro-trade bias and form a more mature and responsive identity.
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The aforementioned identity formation through the GATT era and the launch of the WTO corresponded with the establishment of the WTO's organizational autonomy. Importantly, its autonomy was not simply thrust upon the WTO with its creation. The seed for autonomy had already been sown even under the GATT era in its institutional evolution. In its later days, the GATT began to focus more on the public law aspect of its member states, such as the stability and predictability of the rule of law. The GATT slowly evolved into "something greater than a contract" that its contracting parties would not easily terminate even if its obligations become too burdensome. 388 to agonize over diverse role expectations. 163 Critically, however, such hard linkage risks undermining one of the WTO's core values-free trade. 164 If the WTO authorizes members to freely restrict imports from other members that allegedly violate those social standards, the WTO's old identity as a trade organization would be severely undermined since it would fail to uphold trade values. As discussed above, 165 this symptom accounts for identity diffusion. In general, social standards are lower for developing countries than developed countries because the former countries are poorer than the latter. 166 Without addressing this inherent developmental disparity, merely exerting sanctions on poor countries would never achieve a satisfactory level of protection for putative societal concerns. Contrarily, such ventures-hard linkage-will only encroach on poor countries' comparative advantages, such as cheap labor, and thus generate serious tensions between rich and poor countries without affecting the root cause of the problem. 167 Rich countries may even be tempted to use these regulatory concerns as convenient excuses for raising trade barriers, as seen in green or blue protectionism. 168 Then, the WTO will perform neither a trade nor a nontrade function, and its identity would therefore be lost.
This risk of identity diffusion might also be found in yet another linkage of "trade and development." During its first decade, the WTO failed to narrow the income gap between the rich and the poor. The leastdeveloped countries' marginalization from the mainstream global trading system and the subsequent abject poverty in these countries seriously questioned the rationale of the WTO. 169 This development deficiency This part applies the theory of an IO's identity formation developed in the previous part to the WTO. In the early days, the GATT identified with its founding nations that were preoccupied with the elimination of trade barriers, mostly tariffs. Its organizational autonomy was nearly nonexistent as the GATT was a mere tool for those founding nations to achieve a functional need⎯trade liberalization.
However, as the regulatory environment changed, GATT's pro-trade identity was under attack and it was forced to rethink its original identity. GATT, and subsequently the WTO, underwent this identity crisis as it came to terms with its environment, in particular the regulatory world.
From a normative perspective, the WTO's ideal manifestation of its identity formation is an ongoing process. It should continuously maintain a balanced identity between trade and non-trade values in its diurnal operation.
Many avenues within the WTO system, ranging from adjudication to peer review, can help attain this normative goal.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article argues that an IO, like a human being, is prone to the process of identity formation in establishing its autonomy from its member states. As an IO undergoes various institutional changes, its old identification with an original goal may encounter a new identification with another purpose, and thus it may experience confusion regarding its true identity (identity crisis). But an IO can achieve a coherent institutional self by striking a balance between these multiple identifications under the constraints that various parameters, such as its environment and its technology, impose. Yet an IO may also fail to achieve its identity by insulating itself from its environment (foreclosure) or being adrift in the middle of these multiple identifications without making any commitment to a final identity (identity diffusion).
This identity theory of IOs may find in the WTO its major empirical confirmation. As an organic institution that incessantly interacts with its environment, the WTO has evolved from the early GATT, which was defined largely by a pro-trade character, to the WTO, whose identity formation has been influenced by a strong external demand for a new identification with nontrade (societal) values, such as protection of the environment and human health. From a normative perspective, the WTO's identity formation is to strike an institutional balance between traditional trade values and these nontrade values. It is an ongoing process that reveals itself in the WTO's daily operation-adjudication or peer review.
Finally, this Article addresses the external or macro social dynamics of an autonomous entity itself. It explores how a self-organizing entity
